Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

State of Utah v. Ronald W. Basford : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Sandra L. Sjogren; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
James C. Bradshaw; Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Basford, No. 890281 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1858

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Dtucr

JTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A 10
DOCKET NO.

Q0SV9A»I_ 1IH
foCEftU
^"THEE lUTAH

COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 890281-CA

v.
RONALD W. BASFORD,

Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF A
STOLEN VEHICLE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-112
(1988), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE LEONARD RUSSON, PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
JOAN C. WATT
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

F~a

r"F\

rILbU

Attorneys for Appellant

MAY 2 5 1990
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RONALD W. BASFORD,

:

Case No. 890281-CA

Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF A
STOLEN VEHICLE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-112
(1988), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE LEONARD RUSSON, PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
JOAN C. WATT
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I

CONCLUSION

THE MENS REA ELEMENT OF INTENT TO PROCURE
OR PASS TITLE TO A VEHICLE IS CLEARLY STATED
IN § 41-1-112 AND THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT
NEITHER THE READING OF THE STATUTE URGED
BY DEFENDANT NOR THAT URGED BY THE STATE
BELOW

3
8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982)

6

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

1, 4-5

State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985)

6

State v. Devlin, 699 P.2d 717 (Utah 1985)

6

State v. Porter, 28 Utah 2d 364, 502 P.2d 1147 (1972)..

5

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109

3, 6-8

Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1988)

1-6

Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-13.5 (1988)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1990)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104(2) & (3) (1990)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990)

5-6

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1990)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2 ) (f) (Supp. 1989)

-ii-

1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 890281-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Priority 2

RONALD W. BASFORD,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of a third degree
felony in the district court.

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp.
1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the mens rea of possession of a stolen

vehicle under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 (1988) is intent to
procure or pass title as stated in the statute?

A reviewing

court has a duty to interpret a statute according to the plain
meaning of its terms, and where the language of a statute is
clear, one need not look beyond the clear language of the statute
to determine its meaning.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-106; 76-1-

104(2) & (3) (1990); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 485 (Utah
1988).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The provisions of the pertinent statutes are set forth
in the argument portion of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a stolen
vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-1-112 (1988); and failure to respond to an officer's signal or
command, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-13.5 (1988) (R. 6). Defendant pled guilty to count two and
does not raise any issues regarding that plea on appeal.

The

parties stipulated to the facts on count one, possession of a
stolen vehicle, and submitted the matter to Judge Leonard Russon
of the Third District Court for a decision (R. 108 at 4). Judge
Russon found defendant guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle
on March 9, 1989 (R. 108 at 11-12).

On April 3, 1989, Judge

Russon placed defendant on probation for the third degree felony
and required him to serve 60 days on work release in jail, among
other conditions (R. 108 at 20-21).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts in this case were stipulated to by the
parties.

Defendant accurately recounts the stipulated facts in

his brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant incorrectly reads a mens rea element of
intent to permanently deprive into § 41-1-112 that is not
contained in the statute.

The mens rea of intent to procure or

pass title is clearly stated in the statute.
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In this case no

evidence was presented on this element.

The State agrees for

this reason that § 41-1-112 was incorrectly applied to defendant
and joins defendant's request that he be convicted of joyriding
under S 41-1-109.

The State disagrees, however, that the degree

of defendant's offense is a class A misdemeanor.

The judge found

that defendant did not return the truck to its owner within 24
hours and that his intent to abandon the truck was not the same
as returning the truck.

Joyriding is a third degree felony

unless the actor returns the vehicle to the owner within 24 hours
of the time it was taken.

Defendant is guilty of a third degree

felony under § 41-1-109.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE MENS REA ELEMENT OF INTENT TO PROCURE OR
PASS TITLE TO A VEHICLE IS CLEARLY STATED IN
§ 41-1-112 AND THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT
NEITHER THE READING OF THE STATUTE URGED BY
DEFENDANT NOR THAT URGED BY THE STATE BELOW.
Defendant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112
(1988)(amended 1989) allows the State to convict him of
possession of a stolen vehicle if the State proves that he
possessed a vehicle knowing it was stolen or unlawfully taken
with intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle.
Defendant asserts that even though this intent element is not
expressly contained in the statute, it must be read into the
elements of the crime to distinguish possession of a stolen
vehicle from joyriding.

He further asserts that he should be

convicted of what he terms the lesser included offense of
joyriding under Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-109 (1988), because there
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was no evidence or insufficient evidence of intent to permanently
deprive.

The State disagrees that intent to permanently deprive

is an element of § 41-1-112, but agrees that defendant should not
have been convicted under this section for other reasons.
Section 41-1-112 provided in 1988 that:
Any person who, with intent to procure or
pass title to a vehicle which he knows or has
reason to believe has been stolen or
unlawfully taken, receives, or transfers
possession of the same from or to another, or
who has in his possession any vehicle which
he knows or has reason to believe has been
stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not a
peace officer engaged at the time in the
performance of his duty as such officer, is
guilty of a felony.
This section requires the mens rea element of intent to procure
or pass title.

The list that follows includes persons who, with

that intent, commit any of the enumerated acts.

The punctuation

of the provision cannot be read to distinguish persons in
possession from those who receive or transfer vehicles.

There is

no reason to read into the statute the additional mens rea
element propounded by defendant that a person in possession of a
stolen vehicle must also intend to permanently deprive the owner
of its use.

Traditional tenets of statutory construction do not

require the Court to look beyond the clear language of the
statute to add elements not explicitly contained in the statute
because this Court can determine the fair import of its terms
from the face of the provision.

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,

485 (Utah 1988).
The State acknowledges that in the trial court the
prosecution misread the statute to proscribe possession of a

vehicle which the actor knows or has reason to believe has been
stolen or unlawfully taken.
incorrect.

This reading of the statute is

If a person possesses a vehicle knowing or having

reason to believe that it was unlawfully taken, without any
further mens rea, that person has not violated § 41-1-112.
On the other hand, it would be error to read the
statute as defendant reads it because then the elements of § 411-112 would parallel the elements of theft by receiving,
retaining or disposing of a stolen vehicle under Utah Code Ann.
SS 76-6-408 and -412 (1990).

The elements of theft by receiving,

retaining or disposing of an operable motor vehicle, a second
degree felony, under these statutes are: (1) receiving, retaining
or disposing of a vehicle which is the property of another, (2)
knowing it was stolen or believing that it probably was stolen,
(3) with a purpose to deprive the owner of the vehicle.

These

elements are indistinguishable from those advocated by defendant
as the proper elements of § 41-1-112. Consequently, this Court
should not construe § 41-1-112 as defendant suggests that it
should be construed, but should simply read it as written to
require the mens rea of intent to procure or pass title to the
vehicle.
This Court must construe § 41-1-112 consistently with
legislative intent.

Bishop, 753 P.2d at 485. The Utah Supreme

Court has already stated that the legislative intent was to
prevent the stealing and trafficking in stolen motor vehicles.
State v. Porter, 28 Utah 2d 364, 502 P.2d 1147, 1148 (1972).
While the theft by receiving statute deals with people who
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receive, retain or dispose of stolen vehicles it does not target
the conduct involved in titling vehicles under false pretenses as
does § 41-1-112. Thus, § 41-1-112 cannot be read to proscribe
the same criminal behavior as § 76-6-408.
The State agrees with defendant that this case should
be remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction for joyriding
under § 41-1-109.

See State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1221

(Utah 1985)(Supreme Court reversed conviction of crime defendant
charged with and ordered entry of judgment for crime committed);
see also State v. Bindrup# 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982); State v.
Devlin, 699 P.2d 717 (Utah 1985).
Given that the State agrees that defendant would
properly have been prosecuted under § 41-1-109, the only
remaining issue is what is the degree of defendant's crime.

This

is not a question of sufficiency of the evidence, but one of
statutory interpretation.

Defendant asserts that he committed a

class A misdemeanor because he was caught within 24 hours of the
unlawful taking and he intended to abandon the truck near where
it was taken.

His assertion is mistaken.

Section 41-1-109

provides:
(1) Any person who exercises unauthorized
control over a vehicle, not his own, without
the consent of the owner or lawful custodian
and with intent to temporarily deprive the
owner or lawful custodian of possession of
the vehicle, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(2) An offense under this section is a third
degree felony if the actor does not return
the vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian
within 24 hours after the exercise of
unauthorized control.
(3) The consent of the owner or legal
custodian of a vehicle to its control by the
-6-

actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's
consent on a previous occasion to the control
of the vehicle by the same or a different
person.
(4) Any person who assists in, or is a party
to or an accomplice in, an unauthorized
taking or driving is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
Under this section, joyriding is a third degree felony unless the
actor returns the vehicle within 24 hours.
return the truck to its owner.

Defendant did not

Instead, he fled from the police

officer who attempted to stop him and stated only that he
intended to abandon the truck near where it was taken.

As Judge

Russon ruled, this is not the same as returning the truck to the
owner within 24 hours which the statute requires the actor to do
to obtain the advantage of the lesser charge.
Even if abandonment near where the truck was taken
could be construed as return of the truck as defendant urges,
intent to abandon is not the same as abandoning the truck near
where it was taken within 24 hours.

Construing the language of

the statute according to the fair import of its terms reveals
that the actor must actually return the truck to its owner within
24 hours to obtain the advantage of the lesser charge.
return the vehicle is not sufficient.

Intent to

Judge Russon was correct

in his assessment that defendant was guilty of a third degree
felony even under § 41-1-109.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to remand this case to the district court for entry of a judgment
convicting defendant of joyriding, a third degree felony, under §
41-1-109.

DATED this ^ >

day of May, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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